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racfor_wiki:primjene_strojnog_ucenja_u_cyber_sigurnosti [2021/01/17 13:31] mpuhalovic [Breaking Human Interaction Proofs (HIPs)] |
racfor_wiki:primjene_strojnog_ucenja_u_cyber_sigurnosti [2024/12/05 12:24] (trenutno) |
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Redak 154: | Redak 154: | ||
===== Breaking Human Interaction Proofs (HIPs) ===== | ===== Breaking Human Interaction Proofs (HIPs) ===== | ||
- | Researchers [5] proposed a machine learning approach for breaking Completely Automated Public Turing Tests to Tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHAs) and Human Interaction Proofs (HIPs). The proposed approach is aimed at locating the characters (segmentation step) and employing a neural network for character recognition. | + | Researchers [5] proposed a machine learning approach for breaking Completely Automated Public Turing Tests to Tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHAs) and Human Interaction Proofs (HIPs). The proposed approach is aimed at locating the characters (segmentation step) and employing a neural network for character recognition |
- | Each experiment was split into two parts: | + | So, each experiment was split into two parts: |
* segmentation | * segmentation | ||
* recognition | * recognition | ||
- | Segmentation | + | The segmentation |
* it is computationally expensive | * it is computationally expensive | ||
* complex segmentation function | * complex segmentation function | ||
Redak 167: | Redak 167: | ||
Their method for breaking HIPs is to write a custom algorithm to locate the characters, and then use machine learning for recognition. Surprisingly, | Their method for breaking HIPs is to write a custom algorithm to locate the characters, and then use machine learning for recognition. Surprisingly, | ||
- | On the segmentation stage, different computer vision techniques like converting to grayscale, thresholding to black and white, dilating and eroding, and selecting large connected components (CCs) with sizes close to HIP char sizes were applied. An example of the segmentation process is shown in Image x. The first image shows the original HIP, the second image shows the processed HIP, and the third image shows HIP with segmented characters. | + | On the segmentation stage, different computer vision techniques like converting to grayscale, thresholding to black and white, dilating and eroding, and selecting large connected components (CCs) with sizes close to HIP char sizes were applied. An example of the segmentation process is shown in Image 2. The first image shows the original HIP, the second image shows the processed HIP, and the third image shows HIP with segmented characters. |
+ | |||
+ | Image 2 [5]: | ||
- | IMAGE: | ||
{{: | {{: | ||
- | The first 3 segmented images from the previous example, which are fed to the neural network, are shown in Image x. | + | The first 3 segmented images from the previous example, which are fed to the neural network, are shown in Image 3. |
+ | |||
+ | Image 3 [5]: | ||
- | IMAGE: | ||
{{: | {{: | ||
- | Six experiments were conducted with EZ-Gimpy/ | + | Six experiments were conducted with EZ-Gimpy/ |
- | Table 1: | + | Table 6 [5]: |
| \\ HIP \\ | \\ Segmentation success rate \\ | \\ Recognition success rate (after segmentation) | | \\ HIP \\ | \\ Segmentation success rate \\ | \\ Recognition success rate (after segmentation) | ||
| \\ Mailblocks \\ | \\ 88.8 % \\ | \\ 95.9 % \\ | \\ 66.2 % \\ | | | \\ Mailblocks \\ | \\ 88.8 % \\ | \\ 95.9 % \\ | \\ 66.2 % \\ | | ||
Redak 198: | Redak 200: | ||
* Attacks on availability - cause so many classification errors that the system becomes effectively unusable | * Attacks on availability - cause so many classification errors that the system becomes effectively unusable | ||
* Exploratory attacks - exploiting the existing vulnerabilities | * Exploratory attacks - exploiting the existing vulnerabilities | ||
- | * Targeted attacks directed to a certain input; | + | * Targeted attacks |
- | * Indiscriminate attacks - in which inputs fail. | + | * Indiscriminate attacks - causes all inputs |
- | + | ||
- | The researchers [] proposed the Reject On Negative Impact (RONI) defense which ignores all the training data points that have a substantial negative impact on the classification accuracy. | + | |
- | RONI defense system consists of two classifiers. One classifier is trained using the base training set and the other is trained with the base set and potentially malicious data. If the errors of those two classifiers differ significantly from each other the data is labeled as malicious. | + | |
- | RONI defense defends against exploratory and causative attacks. For defending against exploratory attacks, in which an attacker can create an evaluation distribution that the learner predicts poorly, the defender can limit the access to the training procedure and data, making it harder for an attacker to apply reverse engineering. For defending against the causative attacks, in which an attacker can manipulate both training and evaluation distributions, | + | |
+ | The researchers [10] proposed a defense against exploratory and causative attacks. | ||
+ | For defending against exploratory attacks, in which an attacker can create an evaluation distribution that the learner predicts poorly, the defender can limit the access to the training procedure and data, making it harder for an attacker to apply reverse engineering. | ||
+ | For defending against the causative attacks, in which an attacker can manipulate both training and evaluation distributions, | ||
===== Conclusion ===== | ===== Conclusion ===== | ||
- | Machine learning is a powerful and adaptive tool that enabled tackling problems that so far required humans. It also enabled the automation of threat recognition tasks. | + | Machine learning is a powerful and adaptive tool that enabled tackling problems that so far required humans. It also enabled the automation of threat recognition tasks. In this paper, multiple applications of machine learning in cybersecurity were shown. Most of the problems were solved using supervised learning and classification since their required classifying input into safe or malicious categories. For classification tasks, researchers tested multiple classifiers, |
- | ===== Literatura | + | ===== Literature |
- | [1] [[https:// | + | [1] [[https:// |
- | [2] [[https:// | + | [2] [[https:// |
- | [3] [[https:// | + | [3] [[https:// |
+ | [4] [[https:// | ||
- | [4] https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.05799 | + | [5] [[https://papers.nips.cc/paper/2004/ |
- | [5] https://papers.nips.cc/paper/2004/file/ | + | [6] [[https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/128366/1/MalwareAnalysis.pdf|Milošević, |
- | [6]https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/128366/1/ | + | [7][[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/216864662_A_machine_learning_approach_to_keystroke_dynamics_based_user_authentication|Revett, |
- | [7] https:// | + | [8][[https:// |
- | [8] https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/ | + | [9][[http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? |
- | [9] http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download? | + | [10][[https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~adj/publications/ |